



Automated Analysis of Halo2 Circuits

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Plan

1. **Introduction:** Zero-Knowledge Proofs, Halo2, and Related Work
2. **Abstract Interpretation Approach:** Introduction & Use₂
3. **SMT Approach:** Use
4. **Conclusion:** Summary & Future Work

Plan


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Introduced by Goldwasser et al. 1989

Prove that you know something without revealing it.

“For function f and public input x , I know a private witness w such that $f(x, w) = y$ ”





- Some ZK DSLs and frameworks exist
 - Circom (Bellés-Muñoz et al. 2022)
 - ZoKrates (Eberhardt and Tai 2018)
 - **Halo2** (ZCash; no paper yet?)
- Under the hood, they typically compile to one of the following constraint systems:
 - Rank 1 Constraint System (R1CS)
 - Groth16 (Groth 2016)
 - **PLONKish arithmetic**
 - PLONK (Gabizon and Williamson 2019)
 - TurboPLONK (Gabizon and Williamson 2019)
 - plookup (Gabizon and Williamson 2020)
 - UltraPLONK (Aztec 2021; no paper yet?)
 - HyperPLONK (Chen et al. 2022)



- Popular zero-knowledge proof system library in **Rust**
- Uses **PLONKish arithmetization** to express circuits: circuits are tables, and we add constraints over the table

	Verifier + Prover (input)		Prover (witness)	Verifier + Prover (constant)
	Selector (s)	Instance (b)	Advice (a)	Fixed (C)
row i	1	15	5	83

+ Constraints:

$$s_i (C_i \cdot b_i - a_i) = 0$$

$$f(\langle a, b, C \rangle, s) = s (C \cdot a - b)$$

Shaded area is a **region** and
a **gate**
(entire row in this example)



ZK Bug Tracker <https://github.com/0xPARC/zk-bug-tracker>

A community-maintained collection of bugs, vulnerabilities, and exploits in apps using ZK crypto.

Bugs in the Wild

1. Dark Forest v0.3: Missing Bit Length Check
2. BigInt: Missing Bit Length Check
3. Circom-Pairing: Missing Output Check Constraint
4. Semaphore: Missing Smart Contract Range Check
5. Zk-Kit: Missing Smart Contract Range Check
6. Aztec 2.0: Missing Bit Length Check / Nondeterministic Nullifier
7. 0xPARC StealthDrop: Nondeterministic Nullifier
8. MACI 1.0: Under-constrained Circuit
9. Bulletproofs Paper: Frozen Heart
10. PlonK: Frozen Heart
11. Zcash: Trusted Setup Leak
12. MiMC Hash: Assigned but not Constrained
13. PSE & Scroll zkEVM: Missing Overflow Constraint
14. PSE & Scroll zkEVM: Missing Constraint

Common Vulnerabilities

1. Under-constrained Circuits
2. Nondeterministic Circuits
3. Arithmetic Over/Under Flows
4. Mismatching Bit Lengths
5. Unused Public Inputs Optimized Out
6. Frozen Heart: Forging of Zero Knowledge Proofs
7. Trusted Setup Leak
8. Assigned but not Constrained



- We describe a **Proof-of-Concept / Work-In-Progress tool for analysis of Halo2 circuits in Rust**
- Analyses for the following issues:
 - **Underconstrained circuits**
 - Assigned but unconstrained cells (abstract interpretation)
 - Multiple assignments to witnesses for a public input (SMT)
 - **Unused custom gates** (abstract interpretation)
 - **Unused columns** (abstract interpretation)

Download it here!



<https://github.com/quantstamp/halo2-analyzer>

Related Work

- **Picus** (<https://github.com/chyanju/Picus>)
 - Uses symbolic execution
 - Supports custom queries / property checking
 - Automated verification

... but for R1CS

- **Ecne** (<https://github.com/franklynwang/EcneProject>)
 - Fixed-point algorithm
 - Needs rules to be specified

... but *also* for R1CS

- **QED²** (Pailoor et al., 2023)
 - SMT-based approach
 - “uniqueness inference”

... but for Circom (R1CS)



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Picus is a symbolic virtual machine for automated verification tasks on R1CS.

Ecne (R1CSConstraintSolver.jl)

Introduction

zk-SNARKs are a method for generating zero-knowledge proofs of arbitrary functions, as long as these functions can be expressed as the result of a R1CS (a rank-one constraint system). However, one still needs to convert functions into R1CS form. As this is a laborious process (though still far easier than starting from scratch), Ecne,

Automated Detection of Under-Constrained Circuits in Zero-Knowledge Proofs

Authors: [Shankara Pailoor](#), [Yanju Chen](#), [Franklyn Wang](#), [Clara Rodríguez](#), [Jacob Van Geffen](#), [Jason Morton](#), [Michael Chu](#), [Brian Gu](#), [Yu Feng](#), [Işıl Dillig](#) [Authors Info & Claims](#)

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Uses **Abstract Interpretation** (Cousot & Cousot, 1976)

Approximation of programs via “**partial execution**”: some calculations are performed, but others are not.

For Halo2: partially execute the polynomials, using abstract values.

- Try to determine if some polynomials are always non-zero; then they would not vanish!



Create a new enum that represents a polynomial's value which is either:

- Something (probably depending on the witness)
- Definitely not zero (for any witness)
- Definitely zero (for any witness)

Then “partially execute”: add, multiply, subtract values and get some inference (e.g. $0+0=0$). Example of adding values below.

```
Expression::Sum(left, right) => {  
  let res1 = eval_abstract(left, selectors);  
  let res2 = eval_abstract(right, selectors);  
  match (res1, res2) {  
    (AbsResult::Variable, _) => AbsResult::Variable, // could be anything  
    (_, AbsResult::Variable) => AbsResult::Variable, // could be anything  
    (AbsResult::NonZero, AbsResult::NonZero) => AbsResult::Variable, // could be zero or non-zero  
    (AbsResult::Zero, AbsResult::Zero) => AbsResult::Zero,  
    (AbsResult::Zero, AbsResult::NonZero) => AbsResult::NonZero,  
    (AbsResult::NonZero, AbsResult::Zero) => AbsResult::NonZero,  
  }  
}
```



No witness is provided; we can't evaluate the gate polynomials, but we can evaluate polynomials in regions for concrete values of selector variables and constant variables

So we can get checks for:

- **Unused Gates:** for every gate there exists a region in which it is not always zero
- **Unconstrained Cells:** for every assigned cell in the region, it occurs in a polynomial which is not identically zero over this region
- **Unused Column:** every column occurs in some polynomial

May yield false negatives: may return that a polynomial is not identically zero, when in fact it is

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A Plonkish circuit C is **under-constrained** if there exists an assignment x to Instance columns of C , and two set of assignments w and w' for its Advice columns, where both $\{x, w\}$ and $\{x, w'\}$ satisfy constraints of C .



A Plonkish circuit C is **over-constrained** if for some assignment x to instance columns of C , no assignments to the advice columns of C enable the system to have a solution, but the developer expects there to be one.

Example. Consider a circuit that states that for any positive integer x as input, there are two (distinct) advice columns entries that are positive integer and add up to x .

- for $x \geq 2$ ✓
- for $x = 1$ ✗

it would not be meaningful to call the circuit over-constrained for this input value.



We convert from Rust to **SMTLIB** and add constraints as a **conjunction**.

- For **gate constraints**, we add a constraint that the polynomial is equal to zero

$$(\text{add}(x_{a,b,c}, y_{a',b',c'}) = 0)$$

- For **copy constraints**, we add a constraint that the variables are equal

$$(x_{a,b,c} = y_{a',b',c'})$$

- For **lookup constraints**, we add a constraint that a disjunction enforcing that a variable is equal to one of the legal values

$$(x_{a,b,c} = v_1 \vee x_{a,b,c} = v_2 \vee \dots \vee x_{a,b,c} = v_k)$$




We use **CVC5** (Barbosa et al. 2022) since there is a **finite field** solver for it (Ozdemir et al. 2023).

```
1 (set-logic QF_FF)
2 (declare-fun A-1-1-1 () (_ FiniteField 307))
3 (assert ( = A-1-1-1 (as ff0 (_ FiniteField 307)) )
```

Analysis Logic



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Under-Constrained Circuits Example


Motivating Example



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Gate for x in $[0,3]$

Constraints:



Motivating Example

```
meta.create_gate("b1_binary_check", |meta| {  
  let a = meta.query_advice(b1, Rotation::cur());  
  let dummy = meta.query_selector(s);  
  vec![dummy * a.clone() * (Expression::Constant(Fr::from(1)) - a.clone())]  
  // a * (1-a)  
});
```



Motivating Example



```
meta.create_gate("b1_binary_check", |meta| {  
  let a = meta.query_advice(b1, Rotation::cur());  
  let dummy = meta.query_selector(s);  
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});
```

```
meta.create_gate("b0_binary_check", |meta| {  
  let a = meta.query_advice(b1, Rotation::cur());  
  let dummy = meta.query_selector(s);  
  vec![dummy * a.clone() * (Expression::Constant(Fr::from(1)) - a.clone())]  
  // a * (1-a)  
});
```

Motivating Example



```
meta.create_gate("b1_binary_check", |meta| {
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  let dummy = meta.query_selector(s);
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  vec![dummy * a.clone() * (Expression::Constant(Fr::from(1)) - a.clone())]
  // a * (1-a)
});
```

```
meta.create_gate("equality", |meta| {
  let a = meta.query_advice(b0, Rotation::cur());
  let b = meta.query_advice(b1, Rotation::cur());
  let c = meta.query_advice(x, Rotation::cur());
  // we'll copy public instance here later using constrain_instance
  let dummy = meta.query_selector(s);
  vec![dummy * (a + Expression::Constant(Fr::from(2)) * b - c)]
});
```

Motivating Example Results

```
b0 -> 1  
b1 -> 1  
x  -> 3
```

equivalent model with same public input:

```
b0 -> 3  
b1 -> 0  
x  -> 3
```

Result:

The circuit is underConstrained.

- Takes < 1s to run on this example (no surprise)
- Push-button -- no additional property description necessary to write; but you *could* add more



Motivating Example



```
meta.create_gate("b1_binary_check", |meta| {  
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  // a * (1-a)  
});
```

Copy and paste error!

```
meta.create_gate("b0_binary_check", |meta| {  
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Conclusion



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- We have shown an approach to use abstract interpretation to find **assigned but unconstrained cells**, **unused custom gates**, and **unused columns** in Halo2
- We have shown how SMT solvers can be used to find **under-** and **over-constrained** Halo2 circuits

Download it here!



<https://github.com/quantstamp/halo2-analyzer>



Future work is needed!

- **Limitations not yet known** - no readily available corpus of circuits to test scaling on; conversion, curation, or building necessary
- More analyses for **other** types of **bugs** and **issues** within Halo2 circuits; best practices?
- **Comparison** with, **combination** of, or **inspiration** from other approaches

k -bits	time (ms)	k -bits	time (ms)	k -bits	time (ms)
2	18.940541	16	71.075625	64	730.086875
4	28.063583	32	161.558958	128	4478.517416
8	36.888				

Table 4

Run times for the analysis in Section 3.2 on generalized circuits of Example 3.1.



<https://github.com/quantstamp/halo2-analyzer>

Thank you for listening!



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@quantstamp



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